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The conventional wisdom is that International Relations is an ‘American social science’ 
dominated by U.S. theories (Crawford and Jarvis, 2001; Hoffmann, 1977; Smith, 2000; 
Wæver, 1998). In recent years, however, Chinese scholars have begun debating whether 
and how a distinctly Chinese IR theory or school should be developed (Qin, 2007, 2009, 
2011; Ren, 2008; Wang, 2007, 2009; Yan, 2008). In an academic world with growing 
exposure to online information and journals, increasing academic travel, exchange and 
conferences, it seems paradoxical that the Chinese IR community has taken a nativist 
turn. The Chinese attempt to deliberately produce a seemingly oxymoronic ‘national 
international theory’ is indeed a unique and puzzling case. The main puzzle of this 
chapter is thus how local and global influences interact in the innovation of a Chinese 
International Relations theory. It addresses the question put forward in the introduction 
of this volume: To what extent has globalisation forced China to innovate? The object 
of innovation in this case is a Chinese IR theory and the innovators primarily Chinese 
IR scholars at universities and think tanks. 
 The chapter argues that it is necessary to challenge the commonsensical link 
between external events in the subject matter (i.r.) and theorising (IR), in this case that 
the innovation of a Chinese IR theory is a natural product of globalisation, China’s 
geopolitical rise, its growing political ambitions and discontent with Western hegemony. 
As noted in the introductory chapter, there seems to be an assumption in IR that China’s 
interaction with the world will make it “more like us”. By taking a micro-sociological 
perspective on intellectual innovation, we argue that ‘globalisation’ is not an external 
force that determines and homogenises the way Chinese theory is constructed. Rather, 
we suggest that globalisation processes at the micro-level such as growing exposure to 
Western IR books and articles, educational exchange and interaction with Western 
colleagues at conferences, and the pressure for publishing in Western journals will not 
necessary make Chinese IR “more like us”. On the contrary, we challenge the 
socialisation argument elaborated in the introduction by showing that growing 
interaction with the world, in the case of academic IR, may also lead to the emphasis, 
and even manufacture, of difference.  
 
 
A sociological approach to intellectual innovation 
 
As for the innovation theme of this volume, we abstain from defining ‘theory’ or 
‘innovation’ in an absolute sense as this may prevent us from seeing theories we 
otherwise would (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). The definitional battles about theory—
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what it is, who it is for, what its purpose is—are the objects of our analysis rather than 
something to be defined a priori. Contrary to the philosophy of science that conceives 
science as a thing and tries to define what ‘it’ is, we approach science sociologically: as 
the activities in which scientists partake and try to explain how ‘they’ work. In the 
sociological lens, new theories are understood by what they are designed to do rather 
than their content.  
 Instead of providing an absolute definition of theoretical innovation, we argue that 
it should be seen in relation to the intellectual attention space where it is put forward, 
locally and globally. Theoretical innovations are ideas that are new (creative) and 
important (relate to past debates). As the sociologist of science, Randall Collins, puts it: 
“ideas cannot be too new, whatever their creativeness [but] must also be important, that 
is, in relation to ongoing conversations of the intellectual community” (Collins, 1998: 
31). Richard Whitley has also argued that scientific fields “reward intellectual 
innovation—only new knowledge is publishable—and yet contributions have to 
conform to collective standards and priorities if they are to be regarded as competent 
and scientific” (Whitley in Wæver, 1998: 716). For scholars to successfully promote 
their ideas as innovative, they need to effectively balance being original and 
recognisable. Innovation, in order to be recognised as such, must therefore contain both 
new and old elements in relation to the attention space in which they are put forward. 
According to this definition, the hybrid combination of different sources of 
knowledge—whether old and new, Western and Chinese, or local and global—is at the 
core of theoretical innovation.  
 This hybridity cannot be emphasised enough as it also brings the analysis beyond 
the traditional copy/construction dichotomy used to explain Chinese IR theorising. 
Some Chinese observers have argued that Chinese IR is still “between copying and 
constructing” (Wang, 2009) or between “theory-learning” and “theory-innovation” 
phases (Qin, 2009). However, this quasi-Marxist conception of history as a stage-like 
progress towards maturity and theoretical sophistication that benchmarks itself against 
Western standards, may lead to a constant disappointment, as there is still no purely 
Chinese theory devoid of Western elements. Following the sociological approach to 
innovation outlined above, the innovation of a Chinese IR theory will most likely entail 
copying in some sense, especially as IR theory is a notion developed in the West during 
the 20th century.  
 On the other hand, the Chinese attempt at constructing a local IR theory while at 
the same time trying to integrate China into the global IR family is original and 
innovative. In this sense the term innovation captures the tension between 
recognisability and originality and is well-suited to analyse the Chinese theoretical 
debates that are essentially about how to make a substantial contribution to (the already 
existing discipline of) IR that engages critically with existing perspectives, rather than 
inventing something radically new. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to explain why 
Chinese IR theorising takes the form of combining Western IR with (ancient) Chinese 
intellectual resources, and the focus is hybrids of local and global, particular and 
universal, Chinese and Western. Throughout the chapter, we employ interviews with 
more than 30 Chinese IR scholars to demonstrate how these hybrid combinations are 
made and how they are part of intellectual ‘moves’ (often against others) that aim to 
carve out attention space. 
 The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section analyses the global 
influences on Chinese IR in the sense of import of Western, primarily American, 
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theories and ideals of science. The second section shows how the application of 
Western theory is no longer considered sufficient to become prominent but must be 
recombined with distinctive Chinese ideas. The third section shows how the concept of 
a ‘school’ may provide the hybrid of local and global that gives Chinese IR a place at 
the margins of mainstream IR. The fourth and final section discusses the question in the 
introduction of this volume: “What potential barriers to innovation can be identified in a 
given field?” The focus is on the prospect for international recognition of a Chinese IRT 
and whether it has the potential to make International Relations a more international 
discipline. 
 
 
The Import(ance) of the American Social Science 
 
In order to understand the recent drive to innovate a Chinese theory of IR, we need first 
to understand how global influences have shaped Chinese IR. Although contemporary 
Chinese IR scholars represent a plurality of perspectives, the common disciplinary 
history we are told is that modern Chinese IR was formed following China’s opening 
and reform. The processes of opening and reforming starting in 1978 are significant as 
they allowed for an influx of Western, especially U.S., influences and ideas that 
changed how Chinese academics dealt with the study of the ‘international’. One scholar, 
an assistant professor from Tsinghua, explains that Chinese IR today “is quite like in the 
U.S., we have realists, liberalists, and constructivists”.1 Another scholar, educated in 
physics, who only recently entered IR working on nuclear disarmament, explains how 
he has had to learn the basic vocabulary of Western IR theory in order to communicate 
with his colleagues:  
 
I think all universities, professors at all universities they teach the Western theories, IR 
theories or that kind of thing. [and he continues] The reason I began to learn IR theory 
is because I needed to communicate with my colleagues and my students. That was the 
original reason. I did not feel that IR theories are so useful but I needed to understand 
what my colleagues are talking about so I spent some time to read IR theory, books, 
articles.2  
 
In the eyes of this scholar, learning the theories of “realism, liberalism or whatever”3 
were necessary to be able to communicate with his network.  
A survey distributed among Chinese IR scholars largely confirms the relative 
dominance of Western IR in Chinese academia. When asking today’s IR scholars to 
characterise themselves and their peers by theoretical approach, the most prominent 
streams mentioned are the three paradigms realism, liberalism, constructivism. Realism 
is by far the most prominent. Marxism accounts for a small percentage—the smallest 
when scholars characterise themselves.4  
                                                
1 Interview assistant professor, Tsinghua University, February 2010. 
2 Interview professor, Tsinghua University, March 2010. 
3 Interview professor, Tsinghua University, March 2010. 
4 In our survey distributed among 305 Chinese IR scholars at top universities in spring 2010 we asked 
Chinese IR scholars to characterize themselves and others. Question 9 ‘Which of the following best 
describes your approach to the study of IR?’ only allows one answer, whereas question 15 ’What 
percentage of Chinese IR scholars do you estimate is devoted to each of these paradigms today?’ asks 
respondents to assign a percentage to all categories (realism, liberalism, constructivism. Marxism, English 
school, other, non-paradigmatic). Approximately 58 % of respondents characterized themselves as realist, 
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At a distance it might look like such Westernisation (or Americanisation) is 
simply an automatic product of globalisation. However, it is not ‘globalisation’ as an 
external force, but rather globalisation processes at the micro-level that explain the 
Westernisation of Chinese IR. It has been driven by social changes to the intellectual 
field, supported by specific changes in its material and organisational basis. Especially 
important in shaping and changing Chinese IR has been the personal linkages created 
between American and Chinese scholars, leading to the transferral of both U.S. theories 
and scientific ideals. 
For example, the most prominent scholars in Chinese IR all have a special 
connection to the U.S.. Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong received their PhD’s there, 
whereas others held visiting scholarships in the U.S. (Wang Jisi, Wang Yizhou, Ni 
Shixiong). As one not-so-prominent scholar explains these scholars became important 
and defining figures in the development of the Chinese IR discipline: 
 
Why do you think they became the most prominent?  
Because they are the first generation of Chinese students who got a PhD from abroad. 
They went to America in the earliest years and they got their PhD and they master the 
English language and know a lot about the Western IR theories. Then they came back 
to China. So they belong to the first young generation of Chinese scholars who had 
experience in America and have the knowledge about the Western IR theory, especially 
American IR theory. So after they got their PhD degree they came back to China and 
became a faculty member and they became the leading IR scholars in China.5  
 
Opening to the outside world, thus, allowed Chinese academics and students to travel to 
the U.S. on visiting scholarships or to achieve PhD degrees. Moreover U.S. scholars 
were invited to China, whereby new academic ideas were exchanged (Y. Zhang, 2003: 
99-102). This occurred at a time when access and exposure to knowledge resources 
such as books, journals, conferences, and other scholars was still extremely limited. It 
provided the travelling scholars significant opportunities to return home with U.S. 
education, theoretical knowledge and the ability to attain a certain position in the 
intellectual community and influence it. Other observers also point this out (S. Zhao, 
1997; Jianwei Wang, 2002). But it is not only the visiting scholarship or the degree that 
enabled these scholars to define and shape the discipline. It is also how connections they 
made to important figures in the field during their visits were utilised.  
Large parts of Chinese IR scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s were taken up by 
translation and introduction of Western IR theory (Qin, 2007: 316; Yiwei Wang, 2009: 
106; Johnston, 2002: 35; Ren, 2008: 296). Several of the most prominent scholars 
identified in our survey (Wang Yizhou, Qin Yaqing, Ni Shixiong) are often praised as 
introducers of Western theories (Jisi Wang, 2002: 11; Y. Zhang, 2002, 2003: 102; 
Johnston, 2002: 35). For example, China’s leading constructivist Qin Yaqing has 
translated Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics. Wang Jisi, a renowned 
policy scholar and realist provided the foreword to the Chinese edition of Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations (Johnston, 2002). Translation might seem a straightforward 
task, which would hardly make anyone prominent, but this was not the case in Chinese 
IR in the years shortly after China’s opening. These years were characterised by poor 
                                                                                                                                          
liberalist or constructivist, whereas only 5 % characterized themselves as Marxist. Similarly, a survey of 
Chinese journal articles finds the influence of American IRT “clearly discernible” (Qin, 2009: 194). 
5 Interview professor, Peking University, March 2010. 
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language capabilities and little access to international publications. Thus, translations 
were a way for the few who had access through language and study abroad experience 
to expose the broader disciplinary community to Western theoretical ideas. It is worth 
noting in that context that now-prominent scholars such as Ni Shixiong and Qin Yaqing 
majored in English in their undergraduate education.6 At the time translation of the 
works of well-known mainstream scholars could lead to prominence in China. A 
conversation with a not-yet-prominent associate professor provides an interesting 
perspective on this:  
 
If a Chinese scholar, a professor or associate professor or doctor, if he would like to 
become famous firstly he chooses a person who is famous in Western academia. And 
research and introduce him to the Chinese audience and translate his books into the 
Chinese language and then invites this professor to China to give lectures to the 
students. Then he becomes famous.[...]A Chinese scholar does not have his own theory 
so he has to research Western theory and introduce this theory into China. If he 
introduces a theory or a paradigm into Chinese academia he will become the 
representative of this school[...]Another who researches neorealism, he invites Robert 
Gilpin or Kenneth Waltz and translates Waltz’ book into the Chinese language and then 
invites Waltz to China to give lecture. And then takes part in conferences. This person 
will become a member of neorealism.  
Can you mention any examples of people who have done this?  
I cannot mention it because if you publish it those persons will think he is famous based 
on those foreign scholars. But we have many younger scholars, they become famous by 
the way of this.7  
 
According to this rather controversial representation prominent scholars are capable of 
utilising their international connections to do translation work. By “translation 
theorising” they attach their identity to theoretical ideas (neorealism, constructivism, 
etc.). Since China has not yet produced its own theories, the best alternative is to make 
friends with U.S. theorists. Western, particularly American, IR theories has thus become 
a very important intellectual capital that organises the academic community by 
providing identity-labels.  
 
Building IR on an American foundation 
The exchange of people, education and ideas has been supported by changes in the 
material and organisational base of Chinese IR, more specifically by a massive inflow 
of American investment. Since normalisation of diplomatic relations in the late 1970s 
American foundations and IR academies have invested heavily in IR and American 
studies in China (Y. Zhang, 2003)8 and IR was a particular focus for U.S.-China 
educational exchange from 1978-1984 (Lampton et al., 1986: 7).  
The Ford, Asia, Luce, Rockefeller, Fulbright, and MacArthur Foundations and a 
wide number of other ‘culture exchange foundations’ have been significant in funding 
                                                
6 This type of translation theorising is not unique to China, but has been noted in several other “periphery 
countries” (cf. Aydinli and Mathews 2009; Inoguchi 2009; Sariolghalam 2009).  
7 Interview associate professor, Fudan University, March 2010. 
8 Educational and scientific relations between the U.S. and China were carried out under ‘The Agreement 
on Cooperation in Science and Technology’ signed by Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping July 1979 
(Hayhoe 1989, 124).  
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the scholarly exchanges between U.S. and China.”9 Their scholarships brought the 
Chinese scholars to the U.S., which facilitated the import of U.S. theories. Early 
textbooks were based on such visiting scholarships to the U.S., and American 
foundations also financed the publication of the translated IR theory works in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Zhang, 2003: 101-103). 10  In addition to exchanges, the 
institutionalisation of networks between Chinese and U.S. associations promoted “the 
U.S.-based scholarship of IR and political science among Chinese scholars” (Zhang, 
2003: 101). All this at a time when China had recently opened to outside ideas and 
scholars were intellectually hungry and very receptive. Moreover, funds for research 
and education where at a low, thus enhancing the impact of the American investment. 
U.S. foundations continue to provide generous funding for academies, elite 
universities, and research institutions.11 The Ford Foundation still supports IR in China, 
and ‘state of the art’ studies on how it could be strengthened (e.g. Johnston, 2002; Jisi 
Wang, 2002; Shambaugh and Jisi Wang, 1984).12 Institutional links are maintained and 
today the most prominent IR research institutions are led by U.S.-returned scholars.13 
Consequently, these places have become the favourite stopping places for visiting U.S. 
scholars such as Waltz, Gilpin, Krasner, Nye, Keohane and recently Katzenstein, 
reinforcing the prominence of these institutions. To be sure, not all U.S. funding had the 
intended or unintended consequence of Americanising Chinese IR, but the immense 
academic flow of people and ideas between China and the U.S. compared to that 
between China and Europe or other regions is noteworthy. Whether by design or 
default, U.S. funding provides a material explanation why U.S. theories and scientism is 
prized in Chinese IR. 
In terms of theory, if we stop our analysis here, it is tempting to conclude that IR, 
even in China, is an “American social science” (Hoffmann, 1977) much of which falls 
under the typical three paradigms of realism, liberalism and constructivism (cf. Qin, 
2009: 188). However, as was stated in the introduction, Chinese IR has recently taken a 
nativist turn.  
 
 
State of the art – the debate on building a Chinese IR theory 
                                                
9 For a comprehensive list of Sino-U.S. exchange programs and foundation see the website ‘(U.S.- China 
Culture Exchange Foundation 2010). 
10 Ni Shixiong’s visit at Harvard and Wang Yizhou’s Fulbright scholarship at Harvard are both examples 
of visit that resulted in (in their cases very popular) IR textbooks.  
11 The MacArthur Foundation recently awarded $120,000 for the establishment of the English language 
journal Chinese Journal of International Politics at Tsinghua University’s Institute of International 
Studies and $225,000 more in 2009, $250,000 for the Arms Control Program at Tsinghua University, 
Peking University’s School of International Studies received $150,000 for the International Security 
Program and $1,400,000 for Centre for International & Strategic Studies (MacArthur Foundation 2010b, 
2010a). Another example is the Ford Foundation’s recent support to establish a centre for Non-
Traditional Security Studies at Zhejiang University.  
12 Johnston’s study is characteristic for this literature in its use of “American scholarship” as “a baseline 
against which Chinese IR can be compared.” (Johnston 2002: 3). 
13 Zhang mentions the School of International Studies at Peking University, the School of International 
Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, the Institute of World Economy and Politics of CASS 
and adds the Institute of American Studies of CASS, the Institute for International Studies at Tsinghua 
University, and the China Foreign Affairs University (Zhang 2003: 102, 109). Most are still valid, 
although the current directors of Institute of American Studies at CASS and the dean of SIRPA at Fudan 
University have received their education at the London School of Economics in the United Kingdom.  
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Chinese IR scholars are turning towards an increasingly central opposition line in 
contemporary Chinese IR—the debate on building Chinese IR theory.  
 
If you should describe the field of IR in China at the moment, what are the most 
prevalent ideas?  
In terms of what?  
Theorising I guess.  
The most notable debate in recent years has been whether we need a Chinese school of 
IR and there are several articles published in the World Economics and Politics. You 
must have read them already, so that is the most prominent development. The other 
trend, I think somewhat related, is the attempt to recover ancient Chinese thoughts or 
practices in international relations.14  
 
This quote is one of many where Chinese scholars represent the theoretical debate about 
how to develop a Chinese IR theory as the state of the art.15 Scholars are turning to local 
resources, especially ancient Chinese philosophy, and are debating how a Chinese 
theory could be built. This idea is not new. It was originally a project driven by old 
generation Marxist theorists, by some labelled ‘scientific socialists’ (Hayhoe, 1993), 
who termed it ‘building IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ (Liang, 1997). Now the 
project has been taken over by the young generation of scholars, but it has changed 
connotation from characteristics to school, from isolation to integration, and from 
scientific socialism to social scientism. In fact, young generation Chinese IR scholars 
hesitate to identify themselves with the old generation scholars, whose concepts of 
“Marxist theory of International Relations or the IR theory with Chinese characteristics” 
are considered “too politicised”.16 They, the young generation, do not practice this kind 
of politicised science, but political or social science. A young associate professor from 
Peking University applies the young-old dichotomy in this sense:  
 
The old generation of professors are trained in Marxism, they do not know Hans 
Morgenthau, they do not know what structural realism is. We learned by ourselves. 
Today we can teach this to our students.17 
 
Consider also how Qin Yaqing, one of the leading Chinese theorists who strongly 
promotes the idea of a ‘Chinese school’, reacts when his current work is compared to 
the ‘characteristics’ debate. 
 
How would you explain that there has been this debate on ‘building IR with Chinese 
characteristics’?  
I have never used this term. Because I believe once you set up a school it must have 
some universal application value. I try to avoid it, simply I use ‘a Chinese school’ to 
indicate that it is part of the whole International Relations theory family.18  
 
                                                
14 Interview assistant professor, Tsinghua University, February 2010. 
15 Our survey conducted among 305 Chinese IR scholars at top universities in the spring of 2010 also 
supports these claims.  
16 Interview professor, Peking University, March 2010. 
17 Interview associate professor, Peking University, March 2010. 
18 Interview professor Qin Yaqing, China Foreign Affairs University, March 2010. 
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Another scholar, a young associate professor from Peking University, explains the main 
difference between the ‘characteristics’ debate and the contemporary one. 
 
We have introduced almost all theories of the Western tradition into China and we still 
have a debate about the theory with Chinese characteristics. It is still going on but the 
connotation and the form have both changed. So in the 1990s when I came to Beida [ed. 
Peking University], the discussion was a debate mainly happening between some 
intellectuals who were trained in China and those scholars coming from overseas. 
Those scholars who were trained in China tended to support theory with Chinese 
characteristics. But to some extent their stance was not so supported by the whole 
Chinese academia. For instance, professor Liang Shoude who was the major 
representative of the Chinese characteristics school was the dean of our school. Those 
people are usually much older than those scholars from overseas who were very young. 
But of course after about 15 years professor Qin Yaqing or professor Wang Yizhou 
were not so young again. But at that time they were very young.[...]But after 15 years if 
we talk about this debate, now the connotation has changed much. Now professor Qin 
Yaqing has become the major representative of the Chinese school. Of course there are 
some differences between a Chinese school and a theory with Chinese 
characteristics[...]if we talk about Zhongguo tese, theory with Chinese characteristics, 
that is very strong. It is very very strong. So if you say Chinese characteristics that 
means our theory should be very very different from Western theories.[...]But in this 
field, in the International Relations discipline, if we talk about a Chinese school 
actually it is a very very moderate expression. So Chinese school means we are not 
going to put forward an independent theory, we just want to provide some Chinese 
thoughts, provide some Chinese concepts.19 
 
For more than two decades, Chinese scholars have debated how to put different ideas 
and elements into the construction of a Chinese theory. But the Chinese IRT project is 
not unchanged. This presentation shows that theorising a Chinese IRT is a contested 
project, but nevertheless has been transferred from old generation Marxists to today’s 
prominent scholars (exemplified by Qin Yaqing) in a more Western-oriented version. 
The generational opposition towards politicised Marxists stressing Chinese 
characteristics is important to understand in order to explain the—somewhat 
paradoxical—revival of a Chinese theory project by its young opponents more than a 
decade later. The recent Chinese school project stresses scientism and integration into 
global IR over Marxism and isolation.  
 
Walking on two legs 
We should walk on two legs, not just one leg, two legs. Western and Chinese. 
But in the beginning you walked on one leg? 
I believe for about ten years. [laughing] With two legs I feel that I walk in a more stable 
way. 
Professor Ni Shixiong 
 
Thus, the Chinese innovational drive is neither a product of Westernisation and 
globalisation nor Sinicisation and localisation only, but rather a hybridisation of 
Western and Chinese knowledge resources. This hybridity is exemplified by 
considering the biographical shift of some prominent scholars. Professor Ni Shixiong, 
who is cited above, gained a reputation by introducing Western theories recently co-
                                                
19 Interview associate professor, Peking University, March 2010 
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authored a “sister book” on contemporary Chinese IRT. After having been 
“preoccupied” with introducing Western theories in 1980s and 1990s he has faced the 
structural pressure of the attention space and started to do research on Chinese thinking 
about international relations, to walk on two legs. Another example is Qin Yaqing, 
known as China’s leading constructivist and one of the country’s leading IR scholars, 
who has also become the main proponent of a Chinese school. As he described it in an 
interview, “I move the middle way. I think we need to absorb the very good things from 
Western IR theory, which I think I am quite familiar with and also we need to combine 
Chinese ideas that are valuable of all Chinese ideas.”20 Yan Xuetong, another leading 
scholar known as China’s leading neorealist, is leading a team of researchers to theorise 
ancient Chinese thoughts in IR (see Yan, 2011).  
These are but a few examples of prominent scholars who have renewed their 
position in order to keep it. Mastering Western theories is no longer considered 
sufficient for doing so. Instead the hybridisation of Western social science and ancient 
Chinese philosophy, i.e. walking on two legs, is viewed as a viable way of doing this. 
Consider also how another scholar at Renmin University answers the question why 
some Chinese scholars get famous: “He has, Qin Yaqing has very important training of 
Western education and after he returned to China he integrated the Chinese practice and 
teaching and research so he knows Chinese traditional culture very deeply, so he knows 
the Chinese and Western International Relations.”21 
In order to maintain a prominent position in the Chinese academic attention space 
both Chinese and Western ideas should be mastered. Or, as another professor puts it, “I 
should say in Chinese academic circles we have two authorities; one is the Chinese 
ancient ideas and the Western modern ideas. They enjoy a parallel position…It sounds 
like we have two kinds of shoes and we have gotten used to it.”22 Pure applications of 
Western theory are no longer considered sufficient, but on the other hand this does not 
necessarily result in the production of a radically different Chinese IR theory. A 
Western theory with a Chinese interpretation can also be original as a professor and 
dean at Renmin University puts it: “Generally speaking Chinese scholars of foreign 
policy will continue to learn and observe the mature IR theories already existing for a 
long time. But of course, none of the use or application could be a purely original 
interpretation. Chinese understanding, Chinese interpretation must be attached to it.”23 
His argument relies on a distinction between theory application and originality. As an 
intellectual move, it constructs neither “translation theorising” nor “theory application” 
as enough to be original and instead opens up a space for “homegrown theorising” (cf. 
Aydinli and Mathews, 2009). This change is no great loss for Western IR theories like 
neorealism or constructivism, but it may be a loss for those Chinese scholars who have 
achieved prominence based on these theories. Therefore, they have also turned to 
Chinese ideas—walking on two legs.  
 This can be interpreted as the structural pressure of the intellectual attention space 
forcing intellectuals to be innovative. For scholars to achieve or retain attention space 
they have to present their ideas as new—i.e. create new ideas or reconfigure old ones in 
new ways. But ideas cannot be too new, whatever their creativeness, they must be 
important in relation to ongoing conversations (Collins, 1998: 31). We argue that this 
                                                
20 Interview professor Qin Yaqing, China Foreign Affairs University, March 2010. 
21 Interview professor, Renmin University, March 2010. 
22 Interview with professor, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, March 2010 
23 Interview with professor, Renmin University, March 2010. 
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provides a plausible explanation for the innovational dynamic of combining two 
cultural capitals (Chinese thoughts and experience with Western social science theories) 
and relating them to past debates (developing IR with Chinese characteristics). As we 
have argued at length elsewhere, the opposition and debate internally among Chinese IR 
scholars to a large extent explains why the drive to develop Chinese theory occurs and 
we will focus here on the interplay with global influences (Kristensen and Nielsen, 
2010). 
 
 
A Contender for Global Attention 
 
The idea of a local IR theory is paradoxically not local, but influenced by international 
role models such as the English School and the Copenhagen school. The fact that 
Chinese IR scholars have considered the English School an “IR theory with English 
characteristics” which is different from American theories (Zhang, 2003: 95-96) makes 
its form a source of inspiration. As several others have stressed, the import of the 
English school to China raised the question if there could be an English school, why not 
a Chinese school? (Ren, 2008: 297; Wang, 2009: 110). Consider how an associate 
professor we interviewed in Shanghai makes a similar move: 
 
We Chinese try to argue that we need to have a Chinese school because we have a 
British school or a Copenhagen school. So why do we not have a Chinese school? So 
some Chinese try to argue this and also I think it is a good thing for us because Chinese 
foreign policy is quite different sometimes from the Western countries’. The European 
countries or America, they have a very good theory to explain their foreign behaviour 
and foreign relations. But their theories sometimes cannot explain Chinese behaviour, 
Chinese foreign policy and we Chinese try to have a better understanding and better 
explanations about our own foreign policy.24 
 
This move questions the content of the English and Copenhagen School based on their 
inability to explain “our” foreign policy but keeps the school formula as an inspiration 
for a Chinese school. Besides, the label ‘school’ could also be viewed as a specific 
strategy to carve out a global position for a Chinese IRT. School signifies a non-
competitor to the major theories that define the discipline. As Wæver argues, “the main 
theories that are seen as constituting the core debates at the centre of the discipline (i.e. 
leading circles in the U.S.) are not referred to as ‘schools’” (Wæver, 2004). But the 
label school still allows an independent existence. Usually mainstream IR labels are 
coined by opponents (Wæver, 1998: 715), but here the logic is turned into a prescriptive 
formula: Combining geography (country or city) with the school label may be a pre-
emptive move to achieve some level of recognition by mainstream IR—at least as 
“something they do in China.”  
The Chinese innovational drive should thus be seen in the dynamic of local and 
global academic attention spaces. Theorising Chineseness in IR should both be 
interpreted as a defensive intellectual strategy to renew one’s position in the national 
academic attention space where the application of Western IR theory alone does not 
confer the prominence it once did, but also as an offensive strategy to contend for global 
attention. A conversation with an associate professor at Peking University sheds light 
on the “contender” move:  
                                                
24 Interview with associate professor, Fudan University, March 2010. 
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But you cannot think of other reasons why scholars like Yan Xuetong start to dig into 
ancient thought? 
Yan Xuetong mentioned a very practical reason. He said ‘For Chinese scholars, if you 
are doing research with American style theory you cannot surpass those American 
scholars. Because all these theories are rooted in Western culture. So you can only 
follow up, you cannot surpass that. So if you want to do a real achievement, you need to 
do something that the Westerners cannot understand.’ [laughing] So Confucius is a 
good thing.25 
 
This indicates how cultural difference can serve a very practical purpose, namely attract 
global attention. Qin Yaqing, a prominent scholar and leading proponent of a Chinese 
school, also presents a very practical reason why guanxi (relations) became a core 
concept in his theorising efforts: 
 
In 2005 my focus began to fall on one thing, I asked many foreigners ‘if you come to 
China what are the first ten words that come up to your mind?’ Many of them 
mentioned guanxi, relations. And you go back to Confucius, Confucius’ moral 
argument rests on the management, not of individuals, but of relations. The five key 
relationships are the most important thing in Confucianism. So I think, for three to four 
centuries in Europe basically, of course you could go back to the renaissance but 
basically you could go back to the Enlightenment, rationality became the dominant 
word, if we choose one word that forms the foundation of social sciences and natural 
sciences. I think the counterpart in Chinese society, not natural science but social 
science, is relationality.26 
 
By asking foreigners what is most stereotypically Chinese, a very different theoretical 
core is created. Not Truth, but distinctiveness in the eyes of “many foreigners” drove 
this scholar to innovate. This attests to the fact that cultural difference, or even 
exoticism, is useful in the intercultural scholarly encounter. Positioning Chinese 
relationality as the opposite of Western rationality, this scholar challenges the 
philosophical core of all Western thinking. 
As Randall Collins argues in his global theory of intellectual change, “When there 
is ‘room’ for a new position in the intellectual field, ambitious thinkers will search for 
those elements in the available corpus of materials that will maximally contradict the 
existing prominent positions” (Collins, 1989: 134). Confucianism and the concept of 
guanxi were useful to the abovementioned Chinese scholar. Confucianism and other 
ancient thoughts are theorised in IR because of their utility to gain attention locally and 
globally. Intellectual life is about making a difference. Confucianism contributes with a 
distinct and positively defined Chinese content rather than exclusively negating the 
West. Confucius can be deployed to provide a theoretical anchorage that defines what 
China is rather than what it is not.  
The contender move represents a transition from the resigned marginality of ‘IR 
with Chinese characteristics’ towards marginal participation by developing a ‘Chinese 
school’. The tendency for Chinese IR scholars to import ancient Chinese ideas and 
classical works into the IR discipline should also be seen in the local academic context, 
as a way of attaching something Chinese to IR. But in the context of global attention, 
the argument here is that if cultural scholarship can produce global attention it may feed 
back into local prominence. Developing a Chinese school that achieves global attention, 
                                                
25 Interview associate professor, Peking University, March 2010. 
26 Interview professor Qin Yaqing, China Foreign Affairs University, March 2010. 
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whether as criticism, praise, or repressive tolerance, may translate into local prominence. 
This leads us to the final section on the prospect for global recognition of Chinese 
innovations in IR. 
 
 
China and Global IR 
 
The attempt to construct a Chinese school of IR is a product of global and local 
influences. It should be understood in the light of the import of the American IR 
discipline, its theories and methodologies, which allows Chinese scholars to speak back 
to the core discipline in the language of ‘theory’ and not least to make moves beyond 
existing theories. At the same time, the development and maturity of a local academic 
space specialised in IR has gradually rewarded Chinese intellectual resources, which 
have become comme il faut to remain or become a prominent scholar. To put it in the 
language of the globalisation and innovation theme, Chinese scholars are now trying to 
present an innovative Chinese product to the global discipline. By reversing the process, 
the hope is that a Chinese theory’s “non-European and non-Western perspective may 
eventually contribute to making IR more of an international discipline than it is now” 
(Zhang, 2002: 108). A product that is neither “like us” nor radically different. Chinese 
IR theorising both differs from and resembles the global-Western discipline by 
combining ancient Chinese resources with Western IR.  
Indeed, the project of doing “something the Westerners do not understand” 
suggests that some scholars use essentialism and radical difference to obtain 
international recognition. The very idea of constructing a Chinese school seems to 
promise radical alterity. But, as argued above, even the idea of using the 
location+school formula to obtain recognition is inspired by other non-U.S. theories 
(English and Copenhagen Schools). So why not use a similar strategy for Chinese IR to 
become recognised? One problem may be that usually critics, not creators, coin theory 
labels, and the international IR community has not yet baptised the Chinese school or 
theory. Another obstacle to recognition is that the concern with the ‘brand name’ will 
degenerate into academic identity politics and distract attention from theoretical issues. 
The construction of the Chinese school may turn out problematic if it is monopolised by 
a certain perspective that expounds romantic nationalism and reifies a closed Chinese 
culture rather than opening up space for various Chinese perspectives. By appealing to 
culture and civilisation, one risks giving rise to “nativism which reifies conceptual 
borders of self and other.” (Callahan, 2001: 84). As Gayatri Spivak has warned, a 
strategic essentialism that establishes a collective category of the subaltern can be self-
defeating because it forces homogeneity on the subaltern. The construction of one 
‘Chinese school’ risks forcing homogeneity on a heterogenous group of people in its 
search to become recognised in the hegemonic Western IR discourse. In that sense, it 
does look a lot like “a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible 
political interest” (Spivak, 1996: 214). The problem is how then to speak for those 
whose voices cannot be heard, those who are written out of the dominant theoretical 
narrative in IR? How to speak difference to the hegemonic IR discourse, except perhaps 
as native informants? A Chinese school runs the risk of becoming “subaltern speak” that 
fails to reach a dialogic level—to establish a relationship between speaker and 
listener—but becomes a Chinese school for Chinese researchers, and perhaps a few 
sinologists. Thus, drawing explicitly on culture could also be seen as a nationalisation 
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rather than internationalisation of IR. In this argument, nationalising IR may lead to a 
more fragmented, rather than international, discipline. Indeed, to retain a somewhat 
integrated discipline IR scholars should at a minimum share a basic vocabulary. 
In the attempt to manufacture a marketable product, Chinese IR scholars have 
been conscious about the pitfalls of essentialism and that is one reason why Western-
Chinese hybrids rather than radical Chineseness seems a more prevalent formula. 
Hybrids between social scientific methodology and something distinctly Chinese yield 
the most prominence in today’s IR in China. The hybrid character of ‘Chinese 
theorising’ should be seen in the light of Chinese scholars’ quest for recognition in both 
national and international attention spaces. Chinese IR scholars are involved in self-
reflection over how to balance their uniqueness and simultaneously be recognised by 
the global (U.S.) community. The adoption of U.S. scientific methodology spiced up 
with a Chinese exoticism “the Westerners cannot understand” is considered a 
prerequisite for global recognition in the imaginary of many of the Chinese scholars we 
have interviewed. The recipe may sound simple: Take some exotic Chinese context, add 
scientific methodology, stir, and serve the ‘Chinese School’ for an American audience. 
This may be a Faustian bargain, however, and for a number of reasons.  
The Chinese theorising efforts may simply be too focused on the U.S. market. It is 
obvious that in an ‘American social science’, a Chinese scholar who seeks international 
standing cannot ignore the U.S.. If market share in the U.S. is the sole criterion of 
success, prospects seem dire. There could be other ways to recognition. So far, few 
Americans have waved their flags in the debate on Chinese IR. One who has, does not 
have “confidence in the generalisability of the results when Chinese international 
relations scholars state that the core theoretical problem of the Chinese school should be 
‘China’s peaceful rise’” and argues that it misses “the point of what is normally called 
theory”, that is, “value-neutral terms that carry across time and space for comparative 
purposes” (Snyder, 2008: 4-5). Deriving a theory from China’s rise would indeed be 
parochial. But are the existing theories not generalised primarily from Atlantic 
experiences and thus parochial themselves? It may be true that a Chinese school must 
abstract experiences to applicability elsewhere to become recognised in IR. IR scholars 
in Brazil should be able to take the Chinese school approach. Nevertheless, the 
American critic exemplifies that despite more than 30 years of studies confirming the 
parochialism of the American behavioral-scientific (Hoffmann, 1977; Alker and 
Biersteker, 1984; Holsti, 1985), rationalist (Wæver, 1998), and positivist (Smith, 2000) 
approach to IR, a potential Chinese school is likely to be judged according to such 
criteria by U.S. peers. It is unclear whether many Americans will pay attention to a 
Chinese school. Of course, it is possible that American IR will be more receptive to 
non-U.S. voices as U.S. political and economic predominance falters. But as 
“Americans tend only to read other Americans.” (Biersteker, 2009: 319), the chances of 
being read are probably better elsewhere. This is not to argue for less contact with the 
U.S. discipline, but for a broadening of audiences and exchanges with the non-U.S. 
world and its criteria for scholarly recognition.  
One could argue that other parts of the global market for IR is more open for a 
debate about a Chinese school, especially in the light of the “cultural turn” in the IR 
core (Valbjørn, 2008). To these audiences, a hybrid Chinese school that is “almost the 
same but not quite” (Bilgin, 2008) might deliver the much-desired diversity in what 
critical Western scholars have called an ‘American’, ‘dividing’ and ‘not-so-
international’ discipline (Hoffmann, 1977; Holsti, 1985; Wæver, 1998)? This hybridity 
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might create a global dialogue between Western and peripheral non-Western IR 
communities. Hybridity in the sense of acknowledging different geocultural 
epistemologies and the situatedness of knowledge and experience can indeed be 
productive for such a dialogue. A caveat about hybrids of Western and Chinese thinking 
is necessary. A recombination of local and global resources may seem an attractive and 
productive way to counter Western hegemony but is not necessarily devoid of power 
relationships. Hybrids write, to borrow Tickner and Wæver’s terms, ““away from” and 
“back to” the center in terms that cannot originate independently of the relationship to 
the latter. Nor can they be the same.” (Tickner and Wæver, 2009: 7). The question is 
whether a Chinese IR theory can circumvent its Western heritage without always 
referring back to the West? Can it liberate itself from the negative, the non-Western, 
from alterity, difference and otherness?  
What may seem like radical non-Western moves beyond the West rely on a 
Western vocabulary. The irony of claims to native authenticity is that their very 
expression is inauthentic as they are a product of contact with the West. In order to be 
considered relevant, Chinese theories, as any other contenders for intellectual attention, 
are staged in terms set by the existing knowledge. Revealing a lacuna in Western IR is a 
necessary dimension of this dynamic. In their move of instating Chineseness, even 
‘nativists’ borrow from non-native sources. Chineseness and exoticism should also be 
interpreted as an intellectual strategy to stage one’s knowledge as new. Differences and 
opposition lines are key ingredients in intellectual life. It is important also to interpret 
statements that “You need to do something that the Westerners cannot understand” in 
this perspective where cultural differences become much less fixed and immutable. One 
should keep in mind that a Chinese school, which may seem ethnocentric and 
nationalist, could also be seen as “frankly ethnocentric” (Rorty, 1991: 168). Rather than 
developing a universal (anti-ethnocentric) theory, it is professedly aware of its 
geocultural bias (anti-anti-ethnocentric). Thus, the emergence of multiple voices, a 
Chinese school being only one, may reveal the parochialism of Western IR and 
hopefully produce more theoretical reflexivity. 
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